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Abstract:  The  increasing  loss  of  ecosystem  services  severely  affects  life  perspectives  of 
today’s  poor  and  future  persons.  Thus,  governing  the  use  of  ecosystem  services  in  an 
intragenerational and intergenerational just way is an urgent issue. I develop a conception of 
ecological justice that establishes the specific link between justice and ecosystem services, 
and  argue  that  specific  demands  on  a  conception  of  ecological  justice  follow  from 
determining  ecosystem  services  as  objects  of justice. Showing that  Rawls’ “A Theory  of 
Justice” (1971) can consistently meet the identified demands, I verify that it is an appropriate 
theory for deriving a conception of ecological justice. 
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"Changes in ecosystems typically yield benefits for some people and exact costs on others, 
who  may  either  loose  access  to  resources  or  livelihoods  or  be  affected  by  externalities 
associated with change" (MEA 2005: 62). 
1.  Introduction 
Climate regulation, flood protection, pollination, fertile soils, clean freshwater - the Earth’s 
ecosystems provide a large variety of socially, economically and culturally valuable services 
to  humans (Costanza  et al.  1997, TEEB 2010). Yet,  humans degrade  today’s  ecosystems 
faster than ever and cause the loss of important ecosystem services (MEA 2005: 26ff.). The 
harmful effects of diminishing ecosystem services either appear as negative externalities, as in 
the  case  of  climate  change  or  soil  erosion,  or  they  appear  as  loss  of  access  to  natural 
resources,  as  in  the  case  of  fish,  fertile  land  or  fresh  water.  Today’s  poor,  women  and 
indigenous communities as well as future generations are, respectively will be, disproportionately 
affected by the negative externalities of ecosystem degradation and by loss of access to essential 
ecosystem services (MEA 2005: 62).  
Still, the conception of ecosystem services has not been explicitly applied to questions 
of  intragenerational  and  intergenerational  justice.  Most  research  on  justice  with  regard  to 
ecosystem  use  and  conservation  focuses  either  on  the  intragenerational  dimension 
(environmental justice discourse, e.g., by Schlosberg 2004 and Schroeder et. al. 2008) or on 
the intergenerational dimension (ecological sustainability discourse, e.g., by Goodland 1995 
and  Neumayer  1999)  although  these  dimensions  are  interconnected  (cf.  Glotzbach  & 
Baumgärtner 2010). I  address these  conceptual gaps by developing a conception of ecological 
justice that establishes the specific link between justice and ecosystem services, and that integrates the 
intragenerational and the intergenerational dimension of justice regarding ecosystem use. 
The paper is structured into six sections. In Section 2, I argue that ecosystem services 
are core objects of justice with regard to nature. In section 3, I identify specific demands on a 3 
 
conception of ecological justice that follow from determining ecosystem services as objects of justice. 
In Section 4, I hypothesize that Rawls' "A Theory of Justice" (1971) is an appropriate theory 
for deriving a conception of ecological justice, and prove this hypothesis by investigating 
whether the Rawlsian theory can consistently meet the demands on a conception of ecological 
justice. In section 5,  I  apply  the  Rawlsian  theory  to  the  object  of  ecosystem  services  to  derive 
principles of ecological justice. In section 6, I give a conclusion. 
 
2.  Ecosystem services as objects of ecological justice 
In my proposed conception of ecological justice the objects of justice (cf. Dobson 1998: 63) 
are  ecosystem  services.  In  terms  of  natural  capital,  ecosystem  services  are  the  services 
generated  by  living  funds  (e.g.,  animals  or  trees),  possessing  the  characteristic  of  self-
reproduction,  and  by  non-living  funds  (e.g.,  soil  or  air),  possessing  the  characteristic  of 
regeneration  (Faber,  Manstetten  and  Proops  1995:  44ff.,  Georgescu-Roegen  1971:  224ff.). 
According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), ecosystem services are „the 
benefits  people  obtain  from  ecosystems“  (MEA  2003:  53).  The  MEA  conception  of 
ecosystem services only includes the benefits of ecosystems to human wellbeing. But there 
are also ecosystem "disservices" which decrease human well-being: "Environments don't act 
for the benefit of any single species. There are myriad examples of what might be labelled 
'ecosystem disservices'. Trees take water out of watersheds; forests may be contributing to 
global temperature increases; wild animals kill people and destroy property; and wetlands can 
increase the risk of disease" (McCauley 2006: 27). Because of that, the notion ecosystem 
services, as used in this paper, encompasses all benefits and harms that living and non-living 
ecosystem funds contribute to human wellbeing. 
I choose ecosystem services as core objects of justice with regard to “nature”, because 
they  include  all  components  and  processes  of  nature  that  humans  value,  and  thereby,  all 
possible objects of justice from an anthropocentric view. The chosen conception of ecosystem 4 
 
services, which is based on the broad MEA definition, is not restricted to according nature 
solely instrumental value. Its category of cultural ecosystem services also allows according 
nature aesthetic intrinsic value, Heimat value and sacredness (cf. Krebs 1999: 66).   
 
3.  Demands on a conception of ecological justice 
From determining ecosystem services as the objects of justice follow specific demands on a 
conception  of  ecological  justice.  These  are  global  and  intertemporal  extension  of  the 
community of justice, institutional agents as recipients of claims for justice, classification of 
ecosystem  services  as  objects  of  justice,  reference  to  distributive  justice,  distributional 
structure  as  judicandum,  separability  of  needs  and  wants  for  ecosystem  services,  and 
embedding  in  conceptions  of  social  justice.  Established  theories  of  justice,  which  shall 
contribute to build a philosophically founded conception of ecological justice, need to be 
tested for how far they meet these demands.  
 
I.  Global and intertemporal extension of the community of justice 
The community of justice comprises all holders and recipients of legitimate claims for justice 
(cf. Dobson 1998: 64). The existence of a community of justice presupposes the existence of 
some relation created or mediated by the object of justice (Leist 2005: 1). I give three reasons 
why relations created and mediated by ecosystem services bind people together globally and 
intertemporally. 
 First, the specific characteristics of many ecosystem services produce the necessity to 
extent the community of justice beyond a national community, both spatially and temporally. 
Whereas some ecosystem services are provided at the same spatial and temporal scale as the 
ecosystem that generates them (e.g., the provision of wood by a forest ecosystem), others are 
provided at a completely different scale as the generating system (Elmquist et. al. 2010: 47f.). 
Examples  include  pollination,  which  is  delivered  at  local  scale,  but  depends  on  the 5 
 
maintenance of viable populations of pollinators on the landscape level, as well as climate 
regulation, a service provided at global scale, but generated locally by carbon sequestration in 
organic matter and impacting the climate with time delay (ib.). Hence, human action towards 
local ecosystems (e.g., the clear cut of a forest) can affect the provision of ecosystem services 
at the other end of the globe and in remote future (e.g., climate impacts due to failing global 
climate regulation). Second, generation and provision of ecosystem services are separated 
spatially as a consequence of globalization. International trade, global division of labor and 
multinational corporations often go along with patterns of production and consumption that 
imply  the  harms  associated  with  ecosystem  service  generation  being  distributed  to  the 
countries  of  the  global  South  and  the  benefits  from  ecosystem  service  provision  being 
distributed to the countries of the global North. Third, modern technology (e.g., nuclear power 
plants  and  GMO  technology)  has  enormously  extended  human  impact  on  ecosystems. 
Today’s introduction of such technologies can irreversibly affect future states of ecosystems 
and their potential to provide ecosystem services to future persons (cf. Jonas 1988: 8f., 54). 
As  the  precondition  of  "relation"  is  given  for  both  the  global  and  the  intertemporal 
context, a conception of justice with regard to ecosystem services needs to tackle the question 
how these relations across time and space should be governed in a "just" way. 
 
II. Institutional agents as recipients of claims for justice 
Recipients are the agents within the community of justice, who must ensure justice. I will give 
positive and normative reasons why institutional agents - with institutions being defined as all 
mechanisms which govern human use of ecosystem services - should be the prevailing recipients of 
claims for ecological justice.  
The  positive  reasons  include  the  cognitive,  emotional  and  motivational  overload  of 
individuals. No single individual can overview all consequences of her own environmental 
behavior - because of the temporally and spatially aggregated impacts on ecosystem of myriad 6 
 
independent decisions, the complexity of ecosystem processes and the interdependency of 
different ecosystem services. As social institutions (e.g., eco-labelling) exert an orientation 
function, they can help to interpret and value individual environmental behaviour (Kopfmüller 
2001: 106). There are also emotional and motivational barriers, which impede constraining 
one’s own behaviour for the sake of persons at the other end of the globe and in remote future. 
Social institutions shift the internal control costs of self-restraint to an external institution 
(e.g.,  environmental  legislation),  thereby  reducing  the  psychological  gap  between  the 
motivation  to  accept  moral  rules  and  the  motivation  to  act  in  accordance  with  them 
(Birnbacher 2006: 21). From an economic point of view, most ecosystem services are viewed 
either as common-pool goods or as public goods, resulting in overuse (in case of common-
pool goods) and insufficient provision (in case of public goods) of ecosystem services. To 
repair this market failure, the intervention by social institutions and rules, such as property 
rights, laws, taxes or community management, is demanded. From a governance point of 
view,  most  impacts  on  the  delivery  and  distribution  of  ecosystem  services  evade  an 
individual's immediate sphere of activity. The governance function of institutions facilitates 
the  coordination  of  different  agents,  where  cumulative  effort  for  the  conservation  and 
provision of ecosystem services is needed. All these reasons point to institutional agents as the 
appropriate recipients of claims for ecological justice. By focusing on social institutions and 
institutional agents one needs to bear in mind that it is the individual actors, their norms and 
their  conduct  who  shape  social  institutions  and  who  ultimately  comply  with  or  reject 
institutional rules. 
The  normative  reason  for  choosing  institutional  agents  as  recipients  of  claims  for 
justice  is  founded  on  the  communitarian  value  of  ecosystem  services.  Faber  &  Petersen 
(2008) use the term institutional justice to describe a structure of a community that enables its 
members to lead a good life in the best possible way. Hence, institutional justice includes 
creating  conditions  that  enable  a  good  life  in  a  community.  The  provision  of  ecosystem 7 
 
services could be defined as an essential condition of a good life, in which the members of a 
community have a common interest. The provision of essential ecosystem services could even 
be defined as a basic right, namely the right to physical integrity, in its substantial form. 
Transferring  the  argumentation  by  Faber  and  Petersen  to  ecological  justice,  institutional 
agents would need to ensure the provision of essential ecosystem services to all members of a 
community. As national institutions governing the use of ecosystem services influence the 
possibilities for a good life of people living in other nations and in the future, its global and 
intertemporal impacts need to be considered (Pogge 1989: 256). 
 
III. Classification of ecosystem services as objects of justice 
Theories of justice commonly refer to certain objects of justice (Dobson 1998: 63). In the 
proposed conception of ecological justice the objects of justice are ecosystem services. Thus, 
it needs  to  be investigated whether ecosystem  services  can be subsumed under an object 
category of the general theory of justice. For example, Rawls' theory is concerned with the 
distribution  of  social  primary  goods.  His  theory  can  only  contribute  to  a  conception  of 
ecological justice if ecosystem services can be understood as primary goods. 
 
IV.  Reference to distributive justice 
Ecological  justice  needs  to  be  further  specified  by  deciding  between  first-order  and 
procedural justice, and between various domains of material justice (Pogge 2006). I develop 
the argument that justice with regard to ecosystem services can best be conceptualized by 
referring to first-order justice and to distributive justice. 
Before discussing the domains of material justice, a decision has to be made between 
first-order justice and procedural justice. Whereas first-order justice refers to the "assessments 
of a particular allocation of benefits and burdens" (Pogge 2006: 864) , i.e. to the consequences 
of certain actions, omissions or rules, procedural justice refers to "assessments of the way in 8 
 
which such an allocation comes about" (ib.). The opposites first-order justice and procedural 
justice shall be decided in favor of first-order justice for the here developed conception of 
ecological  justice.  Consequentialism  is  already  an  inherent  part  of  the  notion  "ecosystem 
services"  as  it  describes  the  benefits  to  humans  resulting  from  ecosystem  functions. 
Furthermore, procedural theories, most famously Nozick’s entitlement theory (1974), assume 
that a just acquisition of the investigated good is possible. In the context of ecological justice, 
this presupposes that individuals can claim the moral right to acquire (property) rights to 
ecosystem services. As ecosystems and their functions are given and not created by humans, it 
can be reasonably argued that ecosystem services are common property of humankind (Helm 
and Simonis 2001, Schlosberg 2004). 
 
In his „Nicomachean Ehics”, the Greek philosopher Aristotle (1998: Book 5) makes a fruitful 
distinction between three forms of particular justice (i.e., first-order justice), termed by Pogge 
"domains  of  material  justice"  (Pogge  2006).  Aristotle  divides  particular  justice  in  the 
distribution of divisible goods (iustitia distributiva), the rectification of voluntary transactions 
(iustitia  commutativa)  and  of  involuntary  transactions  such  as  theft  and  assault  (iustitia 
correctiva). I will give some arguments, why justice with regard to ecosystem services should 
primarily be referred to the domain of distributive justice.  
Distributive justice requires that the recipients of claims for justice have common claims 
to scarce goods. The premise of scarcity (cf. Hume 1975: Chapter 3) is certainly given for 
ecosystem services. Because natural ecosystems are not created by any particular human or 
any  group  of  humans,  it  seems  plausible  to  argue  that  ecosystems  and  their  services  are 
common property of humankind and that every present and future person has a legitimate 
claim to use them. Further, distributive justice can be regarded as the most comprehensive 
type of particular justice as it does not depend on transactions such as justice in exchange or 
prior  caused  environmental  harm  such  as  corrective  justice  (Leist  2005:  1).  Whereas 9 
 
corrective  justice  is  orientated  towards  individually  caused  environmental  harm,  the  most 
pressing ecological problems such as human-caused biodiversity loss and climate change are 
caused  by  a  vast  number  of  polluters  (ib.).  Furthermore,  corrective  justice  is  commonly 
"backward-looking, focused on wrongful behavior occurred in the past" (Posner & Sustein 
2007: 20), whereas ecosystem degradation needs to be tackled before the worst consequences 
will appear. By applying principles of distributive justice, both collectively caused ecosystem 
degradation and precautionary ecosystem conservation can be addressed. Distributive justice 
can address issues of corrective justice by including the distribution of costs to compensate 
for  ecosystem  degradation.  To  conclude,  theories  of  justice  which  shall  contribute  to  a 
conception of justice with regard to ecosystem services need to refer to distributive justice.  
 
V.  Distributional structure as judicandum 
Judicanda are "things to which evaluative predicates are applicable" (Pogge 2006: 863), i.e. 
things that can be judged as "just" or "unjust". Pogge lists four different judicanda of justice: 
individual and collective actors; their conduct (actions and omissions); social rules including 
social institutions; states of affairs and events (ib.).  
From the decision in favor of ecosystem services as object of ecological justice and the 
decision in favor of distributional justice follows that the distributional structure of ecosystem 
services is the appropriate judicandum. Hence, a state of affairs is evaluated with regard to the 
distribution  of  ecosystem  services  between  the  members  of  the  community  of  justice. 
Intragenerational distribution relates to the distribution of the benefits from ecosystem service 
provision  and  of  the  costs  of  ecosystem  service  generation  between  the  members  of  the 
present generation. Intergenerational distribution relates to the passing on of ecosystem funds 
to future generations as only an indirect distribution is possible across generations via the 
sustenance of “productive” ecosystems.  
 10 
 
VI.  Separability of needs and wants for ecosystem services 
Ecosystem services contribute to various components of human wellbeing (cf. MEA 2005). 
The consumption of ecosystem services serves the fulfilment of both essential basic needs and 
the wishes beyond. Taken the plausible normative assumption that ethical priority should be 
given to basic needs, a central problem of ecological justice is that want satisfaction of few 
people  by  the  overuse  of  provisioning  ecosystem  services  often  happens  at  cost  of  need 
satisfaction of many people living at present and in the future. The most prominent example is 
the  consumption  of  fossil  fuels  by  industrialized  countries,  accompanied  by  the  loss  of 
ecological climate regulation at the cost of security and livelihood both of many poor people 
in the global South and of future people. Another example is the accelerated demand for crops 
and cattle from industrialized and newly industrializing countries. This demand has drastically 
increased the conversion of terrestrial biomes into cultivated systems during the last 50 years, 
accompanied  by  the  loss  of  various  locally  essential  ecosystem  services  such  as  flood 
regulation,  biological  pest  control,  water  filtration  and  groundwater  storage  (MEA  2005: 
26ff.).  
The ethical demand to use ecosystems in a way that gives priority to basic needs can 
only be addressed if a conception of ecological justice can distinguish between essential basic 
needs and wants for ecosystem services 
 
VII.  Embedding in conceptions of social justice 
There is no sharp distinction line between ecological justice (i.e., the distribution regarding 
ecosystem services) and social justice (i.e., the distribution regarding  human-made capital 
flows). Taken the ecosystem service climate regulation as an example, the impact of human-
made climate change depends not only on the carbon storage and buffer capacities of oceans, 
forests and soils, but also on the distribution of human, social and financial capital. Is there 
money and knowledge to build dams, and is there the possibility to earn one's livelihood 11 
 
otherwise or to live on earnings for a while in case one’s agricultural fields are degraded? 
Beyond the passing of “natural capital”, the passing of technologies, money, infrastructure 
and  knowledge  to  the  next  generation(s)  needs  to  be  considered  with  regard  to 
intergenerational ecological justice. The central question is whether, and according to which 
substitutability criterion, ecosystem services can be substituted by human-made capital flows. 
Substitutability  is  the  element  linking  ecosystem  services  and  human-made  capital,  and 
thereby social and ecological distributive justice. Therefore, the distribution of human-made 
substitutes  for  ecosystem  services  should  be  considered  when  conceptualizing  ecological 
justice. 
 
4.  Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” and the demands on a conception of ecological justice 
To develop a philosophically founded conception of ecological justice, it is instructive to 
build on established theories of justice. I hypothesize that the “A Theory of Justice” (1971) by 
John Rawls is an appropriate theory for deriving a conception of ecological justice. In this 
section, I prove this hypothesis by facing Rawls’ theory with each of the seven demands on a 
conception of ecological justice. 
 
I.  Rawls: global and intertemporal extension of the community of justice 
Rawls’ theory is a contract theory which considers the question of a just basic structure of 
society from an impartial perspective (cf. Barry 1995: 8). He attains the impartial situation by 
introducing an original position in which the contract partners decide on principles of justice 
from behind a veil of ignorance, neither knowing what makes them different from other individuals 
nor what conception of a good life they hold. The Rawlsian theory chooses the nation state, i.e. a 
"society (…) as a closed system isolated from other societies" (Rawls 1973: 8), to be the 
community of justice. 12 
 
Can  the  theory  be  extended  in  a  consistent  and  coherent  way  to  include  a  global 
community of justice across the present and all future generations? In the following, I argue 
that Rawls’ original position offers the potential to extend the community of justice to include 
all people living at present and living in future.  
 
The original position and a global community: The philosophical debate on global distributive 
justice was started by Charles Beitz (1979), who proposed to extend Rawls’ original position 
to the global level (cf. Beitz 1979). Rawls himself rejects a "cosmopolitan" original position, 
but constructs in his book "The Law of Peoples" (1999) a second original position containing 
delegates from different nations who decide on principles of international law. Criticism of 
Rawls’  international  original  position  and  of  the  principles  of  justice  derived  from  it 
concentrates on three aspects: The lack of reference to a globally just distribution of primary 
goods, the priority of national decisions and the assumed analogy between individuals and 
states in the original position (Hayden 2002: 89; Pogge 1989: 240). 
Rawls grounds rights to basic goods in qualities being inherent to all humans (Rawls 
1973:  179).  Thus,  persons  of  different  countries  must  be  assumed  as  morally  equal.  As 
membership  to  a  certain  state  is  neither  a  merit  nor  voluntary  chosen,  restricting  the 
institutionally  guaranteed  rights  for  basic  goods  to  states  would  be  morally  arbitrary  and 
would go along with a morally unequal treatment of persons living in different states (Beitz 
1979,  Pogge  1989:  250,  Hayden  2002,  Langhelle  2000).  To  secure  a  morally  equal 
consideration of all present people, the original position needs to be extended to include a 
global community of individuals (Hayden 2002: 99).  
 
The original position and future people: Rawls discusses three models which would allow 
representing future persons in the original position: 13 
 
1)  The  assembly  in  the  original  position  contains  only  self-interested  contemporaries 
(Rawls 1973: 287ff.).  
2)  The assembly in the original position contains only contemporaries, but they represent 
family lines which have an interest in the wellbeing of their descendants (ib. 292).  
3a) The assembly in the original position contains all individuals who exist, have existed          
and will exist (ib. 139).  
     3b)  The  assembly  in  the  original  positions  contains  representatives  from  all  actual 
generations (ib. 291f.). 
In model 1, the "present time of entry interpretation", there are only persons who know that 
they are contemporaries, but who do not know which generation they belong to in the original 
position. Because of the persons' knowledge about them being contemporaries, they would 
refuse to make any sacrifices at all to their successors (ib. 292). They would acknowledge the 
principle that no one has to save for posterity. In contrast to Rawls' first assumption "that all 
other generations are to save at the same rates" (ib. 287), meaning that the principles decided 
by  contemporaries  are  an  obligation  to  all  other  generations,  he  later  assumes  that  the 
contemporaries  cannot  affect  the  saving  decisions  of  previous  generations  (ib.  292).  The 
second  assumption,  which  is  consistent  with  his  fundamental  construction  of  the  original 
position,  prevents  the  representation  of  future  persons'  interests  in  the  decisions  of 
contemporaries. 
Model 2 summarizes the solution proposed by Rawls. By rejecting the motivation 
assumption of purely self-interested persons, Rawls breaks his contractualist reasoning. As 
model 2 introduces altruistic interests of the assembly members and a particular conception 
of a good life (i.e., the idea of the familiy and of emotional familiar ties), it is not consistent 
with  Rawls'  fundamental  conception  of  justice  (De-Shalit  1995:  105ff.,  Unnerstall  1999: 
409ff.).  14 
 
Rawls rejects model 3a, i.e. a general assembly of all persons who will live at some 
time, because this conception would "cease to be a natural guide to intuition" (Rawls 1973: 
139). This argument is not convincing as Rawls wants to show priciples of justice for an ideal 
society and stresses that the original position is a "purely hypothetical situation" (ib. 120). A 
philosophical argument against model 3a can be derived from the assumption of endogenous 
population development. If the number and individuality of future persons fully depends on 
actions of the present generation, who shall the future individuals included in the assembly 
be? As individuals in the original position do not know about their interests and abilities, it 
would  be  sufficient  to  assume  future  persons  (cf.  Ott  2003:  42ff.).  But  the  philosophical 
difficulty is that there could only be possible future persons and possible persons do not have 
any interests at all (Parfit 1987: 359, Partridge 2008: 5). 
Model 3b slightly differs from model 3a as it makes weaker assumptions about future 
generations. It takes the assumption made by Richards (1983, in De-Shalit 1995: 110) that the 
assembly only contains real future persons, who are concerned with the circumstances of their 
existence, but not their existence itself. More specifically, Model 3b only assumes that there 
will be future generations with at least one future person living and being characterized by the 
same  human  characteristics  as  present  persons.  As  the  assembly  decides  on  abstract  and 
generally agreeable principles of justice, it is not important to know the exact number of 
generations  and  of  future  people  in  the  original  position.  Model  3b  can  therefore  best 
represent future individuals in the original position. 
Although  Rawls  restricts  the  community  of  justice  to  a  national  community  of 
contemporaries,  his  original  position  can  be  consistently  extended  to  include  a  global 





II. Rawls: institutional agents as recipients of claims for justice 
Rawls assumes that the primary subject of justice is "the basic structure of society, or more 
exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls 1973: 7). In Rawls’ 
theory it is institutions and the institutional agents who govern the distribution of primary 
goods. Hence, it is institutions that must ensure that justified claims for primary goods are 
met. Institutional agents are the recipients of claims for Rawlsian justice. 
 
III.  Rawls: classification of ecosystem services as objects of justice 
Rawls’  theory  addresses  the  distribution  of  primary  goods.  For  building  a  conception  of 
ecological justice on the Rawlsian theory, it is crucial whether ecosystem services can be 
subsumed  under  the  category  of  primary  goods.  Rawls  does  not  thematisize  the  natural 
environment  at  all  within  his  theory  of  justice.  Thus,  he  also  misses  to  discuss  natural 
resources and intact ecosystems as part of his list of primary goods. Nevertheless, all attempts 
to  relate  Rawls'  theory  to  ecosystems  show  that  ecosystems  and  its  services  need  to  be 
included  in  a  list  of  primary  goods  (e.g.,  Dobson  1998:  125;  Visser’t  Hooft  2007:  88; 
Unnerstall 1999: 394).    
Rawls defines primary goods as “things that every rational man is presumed to want” 
(Rawls 1973: 62). Primary goods are derived from the idea of the person and the knowledge 
of  the  general  circumstances  and  requirements  of  social  life.  As  persons  in  the  original 
position know "the general facts about human society" (ib. 137), it can be assumed that they 
know  about  their  basic needs  and  about  their  dependence  on  intact  ecosystems  and  non-
substitutable ecosystem services to fulfil them.
 Therefore, persons in the original position will 
commonly regard essential and non-substitutable ecosystem services as primary goods.
  The 
question whether ecosystem services which are substitutable by human-made services or not 
essential for human survival are primary goods is less obvious. It can only be answered by 16 
 
interpreting primary goods as things enabling the exertion of basic capabilities (cf. Sen 1982: 
368). Capabilities are substantive freedoms, vectors of functionings that people can achieve 
with certain primary goods (ib.). The capability approach shifts attention to what primary 
goods do to humans (ib.), and hence to a conception of the good life. Martha Nussbaum's 
"thick and vague conception of the good" (2003) and Martin Seel's "three aspects of a good 
life" (1991: 311ff.) are conceptions of basic capabilities that explicitly refer to nature. With 
reference  to  Seel’s  and  Nussbaum’s  conceptions,  all  kinds  of  ecosystem  services  can  be 
viewed as resources and conditions enabling the exertion of basic capabilities. 
As ecosystem services possess the characteristics of primary goods – with those being 
defined with regard to a set of basic capabilities - , their distribution underlies the Rawlsian 
principles of justice which are decided behind the veil of ignorance. 
 
IV.  +  V.  Rawls:  reference  to  distributive  justice  and  distributional  structure  as 
judicandum 
 
Rawls aims to provide principles of justice whereby the realized distributive impacts of social 
institutions should be assessed (ib. 55, cf. also Sen 2009: 78). Thus, Rawls' theory fully meets 
the demand for distributive justice and for distributional structure as judicandum. 
 
VI.   Rawls: separability of needs and wants for ecosystem services 
Within his two principles of justice, Rawls distinguishes between "basic liberties" and "social 
and economic inequalities" (Rawls  1973:  60). Rawls’ first  principle of justice refers to  a 
system of basic liberties of citizenship that includes political liberties, liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought, the right to physical integrity, the right to hold personal property and 
freedom  from  arbitrary  arrest  (ib.  61).  Essential  ecosystem  services
i  can be specified as 
resources and conditions enabling to exert the right to physical integrity. Therefore, they are 
to be distributed according to the principle of equal basic liberties, i.e. they must be available 17 
 
equally and as extensive as possible to all present and future persons (cf. Visser’t Hooft 2007: 
89, Unnerstall 1999: 416ff). Rawls' second principle of justice refers to the distribution of all 
further economic and social primary goods. As already discussed, non-essential ecosystem 
services can be subsumed under this category. These ecosystem services are to be distributed 
according to the difference principle.  
The principles of justice are set out in a serial order with the principle of equal basic 
liberties having priority to the principles on social and economic inequalities. A restriction of 
the protected basic liberties cannot be justified by greater social and economic advantages 
(Rawls  1973:  61).  Hence,  the  most  extensive  and  equal  provision  of  essential  ecosystem 
services, satisfying basic needs, to all present and future persons is prior to the distribution of 
other  ecosystem  services,  satisfying  "universal"  wants.  To  conclude,  needs  for  ecosystem 
services can be separated from wants for ecosystem services within the Rawlsian framework. 
 
VII.  Rawls: embedding in conceptions of social justice 
Rawls does not explicitly discuss substitution between different primary goods. Considering 
basic  liberties,  Rawls'  only  specifies  the  aim  of  an  extensive  set  of  basic  liberties  to  all 
contract  partners.  The  substantial  right  to  physical  integrity  encompasses  certain  basic 
capabilities which can be realized by varying sets of goods and services. For example, the 
capability to be adequately nourished can be realized by the possession of own fertile land, by 
the possession fishing rights or by sufficient income to buy food on markets; the capability to 
live in a safe in environment can be realized through protection from floods by mangrove 
forests or by artificial embankments.  
Social and economic inequalities are measured by an index of primary goods (ib. Rawls 
1973: 90ff.). What serves the benefit of the least advantaged is determined "by taking up the 
standpoint of the representative individual from this group and asking which combination of 
primary goods it would be rational for him to prefer" (ib. 94). It is rational to prefer goods in 18 
 
relation to their function for individual ends. As I interpret primary goods as resources or 
conditions enabling the exertion of basic capabilities, ecosystem services are substitutable by 
human-made services  in  case they  enable exerting the same  set  of  basic capabilities. For 
example, exerting the capability to recreate can (possibly) be enabled through the recreational 
ecosystem services delivered by a forest or through a yoga course. But exerting the capability 
to be related to animals, plants and nature as a whole (cf. Nussbaum 2003) cannot be enabled 
by human-made goods and services. 
 
Summary 
Although Rawls himself does neither refer to a spatially and temporally extended community 
of justice nor to ecosystem services within his list of primary goods, the previous analysis 
shows that Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” can consistently meet the seven demands. In the 
next section, I therefore apply the Rawlsian theory to the object of ecosystem services to 
derive principles of ecological justice. 
 
5.  From Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” to principles of ecological justice 
A consequent extension of Rawls’ original position contains representatives from the present 
and all actual future generations behind a complete veil of ignorance.  The representatives 
know about their dependence on intact ecosystems and ecosystem services to fulfil their basic 
needs and individual life plans. They regard essential, non-substitutable ecosystem services as 
necessary  primary  goods  to  realize  part  of  their  system  of  basic  liberties  and  all  other 
ecosystem services as further social primary goods. Hence, the representatives would decide 
on  the  following  abstract  principles  of  justice  with  regard  to  ecosystem  services,  termed 
principles of ecological justice (cf. Rawls 2001: 42): 19 
 
1)   Each present and future person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate set 
of essential and non-substitutable ecosystem services, which is compatible with the 
same set for all. 
2)  Inequalities in the distribution of all other ecosystem services are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of the present and all future generations. 
The  first  principle  of  ecological  justice  has  priority  to  the  second  principle  of  ecological 
justice. 
 
Lifting the veil of ignorance 
The  principles  of  ecological  justice  are  decided  in  the  original  position  behind  a  veil  of 
ignorance. After lifting the veil of ignorance, three challenges arise. First, the principles of 
ecological justice need to be specified for particular ecosystems and policy areas, considering 
uncertainty with regard to the future. Second, the specified principles need to be implemented 
by social institutions (Rawls 1973: 7).  The principles can mark the overall aims of ecological 
justice that institutions should seek for, but they do not reveal institutional transformation 
processes  necessary  to  achieve  them.  Third,  individuals  need  to  support  and  accept 
institutions which implement the principles of ecological justice. According to Rawls, the 
members of the community of justice have a twofold duty: "first, we are to comply with and 
to do our share to just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to 
assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist" (ib. 334). Whereas the 
principles of justice are favorable to all rational and self-interested persons behind the veil of 
ignorance, they become adverse to some persons after lifting it. Therefore, justice as a virtue 
needs to be an integral part of a conception of ecological justice in terms of responsibility for 
establishing und sustaining ecologically just institutions.  
Rawls himself assumes moral persons "capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a 
sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice" 20 
 
(ib. 505). Therewith, he develops a more encompassing idea of the human as a relational and 
responsible  person,  whereas  in  the  original  position  the  persons  only  show  one  of  their 
characteristics as humans, their rationality. Rawls’ idea of the human therefore allows the 
Rawlsian  conception  of  institutional  justice  to  be  complemented  with  a  conception  of  an 
“ecologically just person” based on virtue ethics (cf. Becker 2010). 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, I propose a conception of ecological justice that elaborates on the specific link 
between justice and ecosystem services. Seven demands on a conception of ecological justice 
arise as a result of relating justice to ecosystem services: global and intertemporal extension 
of  the  community  of  justice,  institutional  agents  as  recipients  of  claims  for  justice, 
classification  of  ecosystem  services  as  objects  of  justice,  reference  to  distributive  justice, 
distributional structure as judicandum, separability of needs and wants for ecosystem services, 
and embedding in conceptions of social justice.  
I  verify  that  Rawls'  "A  Theory  of  Justice"  (1971)  is  an  appropriate  theory  for  deriving  a 
conception of ecological justice for it can consistently meet all demands on a conception of ecological 
justice. Rawls' original position can be extended to include representatives from the present 
and  all  actual  future  generations,  who  decide  on  the  distribution  of  rights  to  ecosystem 
services. They would agree on two principles of ecological justice: (1) equal rights to a fully 
adequate set of essential and non-substitutable ecosystem services for all present and future 
people; (2) distribution of all further ecosystem services and its substitutes to the benefit of 
the least advantaged, taking the capabilities to lead a good life of the least advantaged as 
reference.  
 
Although Rawls’ theory can meet all demands on a conception of ecological justice, it has 
two shortcomings: its focus on primary goods as objects of distribution and its focus on pure 21 
 
institutional justice. The first can be addressed by interpreting Rawls’ primary goods as basic 
capabilities to lead a good life, as applied in this paper, and the second by complementing 
institutional justice with a conception of the “ecologically just person” based on virtue ethics. 
The principles of ecological justice integrate the intragenerational and the intergenerational 
dimension of ecological justice, and constitute philosophically founded criteria for assessing the 
distributional  structure  of  ecosystem  services  and  its  substitutes.  Investigating  what 
institutional changes are needed to approach the principles of ecological justice and how the 
principles of ecological justice can be translated into context-specific indicators, presents a 
challenge to interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary sustainability sciences. 
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